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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20030122-CA

DEWEY BUD CAMMACK,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
•k & Je

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), and forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, the Honorable J.
Philip Eves presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (2003).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Should this Court review defendant's claim of insufficient evidence, where he
did not preserve the claim below and does not argue plain error on appeal?
Whether a defendant preserved a claim for appeal is a question that arises for the first
time on appeal; thus, no standard of review applies.
2. Did the trial court properly admit defendant's statement, under rules 402 and
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, that he did not want to report a real estate transaction
to the county attorney because the county attorney was "out to get him"?

The decision by a trial court to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App 1996).
3.

Was defendant prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to continue the

preliminary hearing so that defendant could obtain counsel of his choice, where
defendant was convicted by a jury at trial?
A trial court's refusal to continue a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b) (stating that court has discretion to enlarge time for any act required "by
these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court").
4, Should this Court review defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct,
where defendant did not preserve the claim below and does not argue plain error on
appeal?
Whether a defendant preserved a claim for appeal is a question that arises for the first
time on appeal; thus, no standard of review applies.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following court rules are relevant to this appeal:
Utah Rules of Evidence 402
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rules of Evidence 403
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
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issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b)
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused,
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted defendant of one count of theft and one count of forgery (R. 15152). The Court sentenced defendant to two suspended prison terms of zero to five years, a
$10,000 suspended fine, and thirty-six months probation (R. 196-99, 218-22). Defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. (R. 225).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
The Real Estate Deal
In the November of 2000, Tony and Ramona Granillo of Las Vegas, Nevada
responded to an ad defendant placed offering to sell 20 acres of land in Iron County (R.
267:108, 174-75). The Granillos agreed to purchase the land for $35,000 on a real estate
contract with defendant (R. 267:108, 176; State's Ex. No. 4). On November 5, 2000, the
Granillos executed a Statement of Buyer's Costs that listed a purchase price of $35,000 (R.

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,12, 12 P.3d 92.
3

267:176; State's Ex. No. 4). They paid $500 earnest money when they signed the Statement
of Buyer's Costs and agreed to put down an additional $500 earnest money when they signed
the real estate contract (R. 267:111; State's Ex. No. 4, 5).
Defendant mailed a Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Granillos, which they signed
on December 29, 2000 (R. 267:109-10; State's Ex. No. 3). The contract recited a $35,000
purchase price with a $1,000 down payment (State's Ex. No. 3). It also provided that the
balance of the purchase price was to be paid in monthly installments of $334.73 beginning
on December 10, 2000 (State's Ex. No. 3). The Granillos returned the signed contract to
defendant with a check for $834.73, representing the balance of the down payment plus the
first month's payment (R. 267:113; State's Ex. No. 5). Both the contract and the check were
dated December 29, 2000 (State's Ex. No. 2, 5).
Defendant Forges a Second Real Estate Contract
After meeting with the Granillos, but before the Granillos signed the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, defendant contacted Porter and offered to sell him the Granillo contract for
$8,500 (R. 267:124-25,133). Porter agreed, and he and defendant executed an Assignment
of Contract on December 21,2000 (R. 267:125). The assignment provided that Porter was to
receive the payments due under the Granillo contract and that defendant could repurchase the
Granillo contract in February for $9,350 (R. 267:126-28, 216-17; State's Ex. No. 6). The
Granillos had not yet signed the real estate contract, so defendant drew up an identical
contract and photocopied the Granillos' signatures onto it (R. 267:206-07; State's Ex. No.
2). This second contract was identical in every respect to the contract defendant sent to the
4

Granillos except that the photocopied signatures were dated November 5,2000, the monthly
payment was $304.90, and the property description was slightly different (State's Ex. No. 2).
Defendant gave this second contract to Porter in exchange for $8,500, but did not tell
Porter that it was invalid or that the Granillos had not yet actually signed the contract (R.
267:133, 207). He asked Porter not to record the assignment of the contract (R. 267:135).
Defendant did not tell the Granillos of the assignment, so the Granillos made at least three
payments totaling $1004.19 to defendant (R. 267:112-14; State's Ex. No. 5). Defendant
cashed the checks, but never gave the payments to Porter (R. 267:128, 217; State's Ex. No.
5).
Defendant's deception did not come to light until, by coincidence, both Porter and
defendant tried to sell their respective contracts to Tom Comstock (R. 267:79, 81).
Comstock researched the contracts and contacted the Granillos (R. 267:82-83). He decided
that Porter's contract was invalid but that Porter had a legal interest in the valid contract
possessed by defendant (R. 267:82-83, 96). When defendant learned that his forgery had
been discovered, he approached Porter and tried to exchange the valid contract for the invalid
contract (R. 267:134). Porter refused because he felt uncomfortable with the transaction and
was unsure how to proceed (R. 267:134-35).
Comstock agreed to pay Porter $15,000 for Porter's interest in the valid contract (R.
267:96, 101). Comstock prepared a letter to the Granillos, which defendant signed,
acknowledging that defendant had assigned his interest in the contract to Porter and that
Porter had now assigned his interest to Comstock (R. 267:100,104; Defendant's Ex. No. 7).
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The letter instructed the Granillos to remit their next payment to Comstock through Southern
Utah Title (R. 267:104; Defendant's Ex. No. 7).
The Trial
The State charged defendant with one count of second degree theft and one count of
forgery (R. 1-3). At trial, the State sought to introduce evidence that Porter had encouraged
defendant to report their transaction to the authorities and that defendant was reluctant to do
so, because the county attorney was "out to get [him]" (R. 267:137). Defendant objected (R.
267:137) He reminded the court that it had previously ruled that the State could not
introduce evidence of defendant's probation agreement with the county attorney's office (R.
267:156). Defendant then asserted that in order to explain the context of the statement to the
jury, he would need to reveal the existence of the probation agreement (R. 267:156-57).
Defendant also claimed the statement was irrelevant (R. 267:156-57). The trial court
overruled defendant's objection (R. 267:137, 155). It reasoned that defendant's statement
was probative of his consciousness of guilt and, though ambiguous, could be construed to
indicated that defendant knew he had committed a crime (R. 267:155).
Defendant testified at trial that he photocopied the Granillos' signatures onto the
contract he sold to Porter (R. 267:206). He claimed that the forged contract was an "example
contract" he created (R. 267:180, 206). He confessed on cross-examination, however, that
he "made up" the example contract and had "never heard of one before" (R. 267:206). He
also admitted that, according to the contract, Porter was to receive the Granillos' payments
and that defendant never gave Porter any of those payments (R. 267:216-17). He also
6

acknowledged that the "example contract" was not a binding contract, but that he let Porter
believe it was (EL 267:224).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. Defendant never objected to the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial
court and has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. He has
therefore waived this claim.
POINT II. Evidence of defendant's reluctance to go to the authorities was relevant to
demonstrate his consciousness of guilt. It is not evidence of prior bad acts or prior crimes
and not substantially more prejudicial than probative. The evidence is not, therefore,
excludable under rule 403 or 404, Utah Rules of Evidence.
POINT III. A jury's verdict renders harmless any errors or misconduct in the
preliminary hearing. Defendant's claim that he was denied the assistance of counsel at the
preliminary hearing is therefore mooted by the jury's verdict.
POINT IV. Defendant did not preserve his claim of prosecutorial misconduct and
has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. The claim is therefore
waived.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PRESERVED
BELOW; MOREOVER, THE CLAIM HAS NO MERIT
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
forgery and theft because Porter received more than he bargained for. Aplt. Br. at 18-23.
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He concludes that Porter's windfall negated any actual theft and also negated any intent to
defraud. Aplt. Br. at 19, 21.
As explained below, defendant's claim is meritless.
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim for appeal and did not assert
plain error or exceptional circumstances in his opening brief.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11,10 P.3d 346. This "rule applies to every claim,
including constitutional questions . . ." Id. To properly preserve a claim, a party must
present the objection to the trial court, state the grounds for the objection specifically and
distinctly, and ensure that the objection and its supporting arguments become part of the trial
record. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d
358, 361 (Utah App. 1993).

In the context of claims of insufficient evidence, the

preservation rule "prevents] a defendant from deliberately foregoing relief below on the
sufficiency of the evidence, hoping that a remediable evidentiary defect might not be
perceived and corrected, thus strategically facilitating the defendant's chance for a reversal
on appeal." Holgate 2000 UT 74, If 16.
This Court may review an unpreserved claim only if it finds exceptional
circumstances or plain error Id. at ^j 11. Appellants must, however, raise plain error and
exceptional circumstances in their opening brief, otherwise the claim is waived. See Brown
v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the
reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be
considered by the appellate court."); State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^ 12 n.4, 63 P.3d
8

110 (refusing to consider robbery defendant's unpreserved claim that State never proved that
he had purpose to deprive where defendant raised plain error for the first time in reply brief);
State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 33 n.5, 64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to consider defendant's
unpreserved claim that jury instructions were incorrect where defendant raised plain error for
first time in reply brief); cf. Utah R. App. P. 24(c) ("Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief"). This rule prevents "unfairness
to the respondent if an argument or issue [is] first raised in the reply brief and the respondent
[has] no opportunity to respond." Glover, 2000 UT 895 ^f 23.
Defendant never objected to the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court. He did
not move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, and he did not make any preor post-verdict motions that would have allowed the trial court to consider and rule on the
sufficiency of the evidence (R. 160-62; 267:172, 225, 272). Defendant has not preserved
this issue for appeal and thus may only maintain his claim of insufficient evidence by
asserting plain error or exceptional circumstances. Defendant has not, however, argued plain
error or exceptional circumstances in his opening brief. He may not raise those claims for
the first time in his reply brief Hence, defendant's claim of insufficient evidence fails.
B. Defendant did not properly marshal the evidence.
This Court should also refuse to consider defendant's claims because he did not
properly marshal the evidence.
When a defendant attacks a conviction on the sufficiency of the evidence, he must
first marshal all of the evidence supporting the conviction and then demonstrate to the Court
9

how the evidence is insufficient. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Proper marshalling requires
the appellant to present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a
fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah. App. 1991). Merely reviewing all the evidence before the fact finder is insufficient.
See Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991) (finding that
defendant failed to satisfy marshaling obligation where he "reviewed in minute detail all the
evidence" and "left it to the court to sort out what evidence actually supported the findings").
Rather, "[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume
the adversary's position." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. Failure to meet the
marshaling burden is grounds to reject an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,1j 16, 989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d
789, 800 (Utah 1991).
Defendant never presents a single, unified compilation of the facts supporting his
guilt. His Statement of Facts weaves together inculpatory and exculpatory facts, and even
omits crucial facts. See Aplt. Br. at 11-15. For example, defendant's brief fails to mention
that, after defendant assigned the Granillo contract to Porter, the Granillos made three
monthly payments on the contract to defendant, who cashed the payments and kept the
money for himself (R. 267:112-14,128,217; State's Ex. No. 5). This crucial fact was likely
the basis for the jury finding that defendant committed third degree theft. Defendant has thus
10

"left it to the [CJourt to sort out what evidence actually supported the findings" and even
omitted important evidence. Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 464. This Court should therefore reject
his claim.
C. The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft and forgery.
Even if defendant had preserved his claim for appeal and properly marshaled the
facts, his claim would still fail because the evidence was sufficient. This Court reviews the
evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Colwell, 2000
UT 8, f 42,994 P.2d 177. "A jury conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence 'only
if the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds could not have
reached the verdict.'" State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 74, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v.
Colwell 2000 UT 8, % 40, 994 P.2d 177).
1.

Defendant committed theft

The crime of third degree theft requires the State to prove that defendant obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over property of another valued at more than $1000 with a
purpose to deprive him thereof. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; Utah Code Ann. 76-6412(l)(b).
Both defendant and Terry Porter testified at trial that defendant assigned his interest in
the Granillos contract to Porter for $8,500 and that, under the contract, Porter was to receive
the monthly payments (R. 267:126-28,216; State's Ex. No. 6). The Granillos made monthly
payments totaling $1004.19 to defendant, who never remitted any of those payments to
Porter (R. 267:128, 217; State's Ex. No. 5). Instead, he cashed the Granillos' checks and
11

kept the money (State's Ex. No. 5). The jury could thus have found defendant guilty of theft
for misappropriating $1004.19 in contractual payments from the Granillos. The jury could
infer purpose to deprive from the fact that defendant knew under the contract that the
payments belonged to Porter yet never, even after he was caught, gave those payments to
Porter.
Defendant claims that the evidence does not sustain a theft conviction because "Porter
appears to have benefitted [sic] beyond the terms of his agreement and therefore it is difficult
to see how theft was committed against him." Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant's argument
misconstrues the law. A person commits theft if he or she exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with the purpose to deprive. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.
When defendant misappropriated the Granillos' payments, he manifested the necessary acts
and state of mind to be convicted of theft. Porter's subsequent sale of the Granillo contract
for more than he paid for it does not nullify defendant's theft. Under the terms of the
assignment, Porter was entitled to both the monthly payments and any proceeds from the sale
of the contract (State's Ex. No. 6).
2.

Defendant committed forgery.

Forgery occurs when a person "makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues,
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(l)(b). The crime of forgery requires that the
defendant act "with purpose to defraud anyone." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999).
12

This Court has defined fraud as "an intentional misrepresentation offered for the purpose of
inducing reliance upon it to gain some advantage." State ex rel P.S., 2001 UT App 305, \
17, 38 P.3d 303. A factfinder may infer intent to defraud from the act of signing another's
name, but there must be a connection between the fraudulent act and the fraudulent intent.
See State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Williams, 111 P.2d
220, 223 (Utah 1985). "[A] defendant who has signed another's name without permission,
while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the unauthorized
endorsement, has not committed forgery." Winward, 909 P.2d at 913.
Defendant admitted that he photocopied the Granillo's signatures onto the real estate
contract he sold to Porter (R. 267:206). He never told Porter that the real estate contract was
a forgery and, in fact, tried to sell the valid contract to Tom Comstock (R. 267:134-35,138—
39, 221). The jury could reasonably infer from those facts that defendant forged the
Granillo's signatures for the purpose of defrauding Porter out of $8,500.
Defendant claims the evidence of forgery was insufficient because the State never
proved intent to defraud. Aplt. Br. at 21. Specifically, he claims that evidence that
defendant attempted to give Porter the valid contract in exchange for the forged contract
negates any inference of intent to defraud Porter. Aplt. Br. at 21. Defendant did not do so,
however, until his forgery was discovered by Tom Comstock (R. 267:139). At that point the
crime had been completed. Moreover, if an offer to rectify a fraud were sufficient to negate
an inference of intent to defraud, then forgers could always escape conviction by simply
offering to correct the forgery if and when they were caught.
13

Defendant also claims that there was no fraud because Porter received more than he
bargained for. Aplt. Br. at 21. This claims fails with respect to the forgery conviction for the
same reason it fails for the theft conviction. Porter's subsequent windfall does not negate
defendant's prior criminal act and criminal intent, especially where defendant did not attempt
to remedy his criminal actions until he was caught (R. 267:139).
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT DID NOT WANT THE TRANSACTION REPORTED TO
THE COUNTY ATTORNEY; MOREOVER, THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE RENDERED ANY ERROR HARMLESS
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State
to ask Porter about defendant's response to Porter's suggestion that defendant report the
transaction to the authorities. Aplt. Br. at 23. Specifically, defendant claims that his
response was irrelevant and that it was inadmissible evidence of prior crimes. Aplt. Br. at
23-24.
A. Defendant's response was relevant to show defendant's criminal intent.
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state." Utah R. Evid. 402. Thus, the testimony of
defendant's reluctance to contact the authorities was proper if the evidence was relevant and
did not violate any other rule of evidence.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. "[T]he standard for determining the relevancy
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of evidence is very low, and even evidence with the slightest probative value is relevant."
State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, % 34, 44 P.3d 805 (quotations omitted); see also Jaeger, 1999
UT 1, \ 12; State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, f 15, 67 P.3d 1005.
In the instant case, the State asked Porter, "When you encouraged Mr. Cammack to go
to the authorities, what did he tell you?" (R. 267:137). Porter replied, "He said that he
couldn't do t h a t . . . because the county attorney's office was - 1 can't remember the exact
words, like they're out to get me, they have my number or, you know, like you know what
they would do to me or something along that line" (R. 267:137-38). The trial court ruled
that the evidence was relevant to defendant's state of mind and tended to show that defendant
understood that his activities might have constituted a crime (R. 267:155). The trial court
acknowledged, however, that the statement was ambiguous and that the jury should
determine the meaning (R. 267:155).
Defendant's reluctance to go the authorities is analogous to a perpetrator's flight from
police. The jury may, but need not, infer consciousness of guilt from a person's flight. See
State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 2 7 1 4 14,987 P.2d 1281 (approving flight instruction that told
jury that it may infer consciousness of guilt from flight). While defendant did not physically
run from the county attorney, his desire to conceal his actions from the authorities is
similarly indicative of a guilty mind. It demonstrated that, contrary to defendant's claims at
trial, defendant knew that he had broken the law when he sold a forged real estate contract to
Porter and misappropriated the monthly payments on the contract. Defendant's response
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thus had some probative value and was properly admitted unless excludable under some
other rule of evidence.
Defendant asserts that his reluctance to contact the authorities was irrelevant because
it occurred "long after the execution of the assignment." Aplt. Br. at 23. The length of time
between the forgery and the statement, however, does not negate the statement's probative
value. The statement is evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt, not of his state of
mind when he committed the crime.
B. Porter's testimony was not evidence of prior criminal acts; moreover,
it was submitted for a proper non-character purpose.
Defendant asserts that Porter's testimony "more or less opened the door to making
mention of prior criminal acts of [defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 23. He claims the testimony was
inadmissible character evidence because it had no purpose other than "to disgrace the
defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime." Aplt. Br. at 24.
Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible to "to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of prior
crimes is admissible, however, for non-character purposes "such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). In other words, "[e]vidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad
acts is admissible 'if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of
Rules 402 and 403.'" State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, H 25, 52 P.3d 1194 (quotingUtahR.
Evid, 404(b) (pre-2001 amendment)).
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In the instant case, defendant admits that Porter's testimony itself is not evidence of
prior crimes, but rather, only "opened the door to making mention of prior criminal acts."
Aplt. Br. at 23. Defendant never explains why rule 404(b) should apply to evidence that
merely opens the door to making mention of prior crimes, and this Court should refuse to do
so for him. See State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ][ 31, 973 P.2d 404 (stating that court is not "a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research").
Even if rule 404(b) does apply, however, defendant's claim still fails because, as
explained above, the prosecutor offered the evidence for a proper non-character purpose: to
show defendant's consciousness of guilt. Additionally, the relevance of the testimony was
not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury" Utah. R. Evid. 403. The jury never learned of defendant's probation
agreement or the crimes which preceded the agreement. No reasonable person would infer
from the statement alone that defendant had previously been convicted of a crime.
Defendant correctly acknowledges that "when relevant evidence is admissible for one
purpose and inadmissible for another purpose, the trial judge upon request shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." Aplt. Br. at 24-25 (emphasis
added). As explained below, however, defendant never requested a limiting instruction and
has therefore waived the issue.
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C. Defendant did not request a limiting instruction and did not object to
the jury instruction on forgery and has therefore waived any claims
regarding those issues.
Defendant asserts that the trial court should have issued a limiting instruction
regarding Porter's testimony that defendant was reluctant to contract the authorities. Aplt.
Br. at 23-25. Defendant admits, however, that he never requested such an instruction and
hence his claim "may have been waived." Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant is correct. His trial
counsel never asked the court to instruct the jury on the proper scope of the testimony of
defendant's reluctance to contact the authorities. Defendant has not argued plain error or
exceptional circumstances on appeal. Thus, the claim is waived. See State v. Rocco, 795
P.2d 1116,1119 (Utah 1990) (holding that failure to request limiting instruction constitutes
waiver of any claim that the court should have issued an instruction).
Defendant also asserts that the jury instruction on forgery did not adequately apprise
the jury that to convict him of forgery it must find a connection between his act of forgery
and his fraudulent intent. Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant, however, never objected to the forgery
instruction and, in fact, approved the instructions before they were read to the jury (R.
267:227). Defendant has therefore waived this claim because he did not preserve it below
and has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. See Utah R. Crim.
P. 19(e) ("Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice."); State v.
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1998) (holding that defendant waived claim of error in
jury instructions where he did not object at trial to instructions); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d
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688, 700-01 (Utah App. 1995) (refusing to consider defendant's claim of error in the jury
instructions where defendant approved instructions at trial).
D. The admission of defendant's statement was, at most, harmless
because defendant admitted the elements of theft and forgery in his
trial testimony,
"[A]n appellate court will not overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper
evidence if the admission of the evidence did not reasonably effect the likelihood of a
different verdict." State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, If 26, 62 P.3d 444.
Exclusion of the testimony of defendant's reluctance to go to the authorities would not
have changed the outcome of the trial because defendant essentially confessed at trial.
Defendant's own testimony established that he exercised unauthorized control over the
property of another valued at more than $ 1,000 with intent to deprive. See Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-404. Defendant admitted that the Assignment of Contract entitled Porter to the
monthly payments on the Granillo real estate contract (R. 267:216).

Defendant

acknowledged that he had drafted the assignment contract and that it was clear from the
language of the contract that Porter was entitled to the payments (R. 267:215-16).
Defendant also admitted that he never gave Porter any of the Granillos' monthly payments
and that when Porter had asked if any payments had been made, defendant had lied and had
told him that the Granillos had only made one payment (R. 267:216-17). He also admitted
that he never returned the payments to the Granillos (R. 267:220).
Defendant's own testimony also established that he made a writing that purported to
be the act of another for the purpose of defrauding Terry Porter. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
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501. Defendant confessed that he photocopied the Granillos's signatures onto a real estate
contract and sold it to Porter for $8,500 (R. 267:206). He admitted that he let Porter believe
that the contract was valid and never told him about the second contract that the Granillos
actually signed (R. 267:207, 224). Defendant then confessed that he never returned the
$8,500 to Porter (R. 267:221).
Thus, defendant confessed in open court to all the elements of theft and forgery and
any error in admitting evidence of his reluctance to contact the authorities was harmless.
III.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
LACKS RECORD SUPPORT AND IS MOOTED BY THE JURY'S
GUILTY VERDICT

Defendant asserts that he was denied the assistance of counsel at the preliminary
hearing when the trial court refused to continue the hearing so that he could retain counsel.
Aplt. Br. at 26. He asserts that this error was "fundamental" and "can not be considered in
any light other than an error of substantial and prejudicial impact." Aplt. Br. at 27.
Defendant has failed to provide an adequate record to support his claim. "Parties
claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to
support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah
1993); State v. Penman, 964 P.2dll57,1162 (Utah App. 1998). "'When crucial matters are
not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial
court.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 2 4 4 13,69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Linden, 761 P.2d
1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)). "Consequently, in the face of'an [inadequate record on appeal
[this Court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.'" Penman, 964 P.2d at
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1162 (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)) (first alteration in
original); see also Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67; State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App.
1995).
Defendant has not provided a transcript of the preliminary hearing, so the minute
entry of the preliminary hearing provides the only evidence of his claim(R. 34-35). The
minute entry indicates that defendant was present at the hearing without counsel (R. 35).
Defendant requested a continuance to retain counsel (R. 35). The State opposed a
continuance, and the trial court denied defendant's request (R. 35). The preliminary hearing
was held the same day with defendant representing himself (R. 34-35). The minute entry
provides no explanation for the State's objection or the court's ruling (R. 35). Defendant
asserts, without citation to the record, that the prosecutor objected to the continuance because
of inconvenience to the witnesses. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Without a record of why the State
objected and why the trial court denied defendant's motion, this Court must assume that the
objection and ruling were grounded in the law and thus proper. See Penman, 964 P.2d at
1162.
Defendant's claim also is mooted by the jury's verdict. Once a jury renders a guilty
verdict, any error or misconduct in the preliminary hearing becomes harmless. See State v.
Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 13, 989 P.2d 52 (holding that prosecutorial misconduct during grand
jury proceedings was mooted by subsequent petit jury verdict of guilty); State v. Quas, 837
P.2d 565, 567 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that guilty verdict mooted question as to whether
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information should have been quashed); State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 n. 6 (Utah
1991) (noting that challenges to magistrate's bindover order are mooted by guilty verdict).
IV.

DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

HIS

CLAIM

OF

Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when he
used the word "bogus" during trial to describe the forged real estate contract. Aplt. Br. at 27.
He claims that his trial counsel objected to the word and that the trial court sustained the
objection.
The prosecutor described the forged contract as "bogus" several times throughout the
trial including during opening argument, during the testimonies of Tom Comstock, Terry
Porter, and defendant, and during closing argument (R. 267:62,64,102,134,139,153,224,
268, 247, 269). Defendant never object to the prosecutor's use of the word. Defendant
claims in his brief that his trial counsel objected during Terry Porter's testimony on page 153
of the trial transcript. Aplt. Br. at 27. That objection, however, was not to the word "bogus,"
but rather, to the prosecutor asking a question which had already been asked and answered.
Defendant did not preserve his claim and has not argued plain error or exceptional
circumstances; his claim therefore fails. See Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 23.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions
Respectfully submitted March 5, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
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